Abstract: The situationist psychology experiments (e.g. Milgram's Obedience to Authority) demonstrate that agents can be more readily induced to act badly than most of us expect. Doris (2002) has argued these experiments show agent behaviour is more determined by circumstantial environmental factors than by stable, inner character traits. Because of this, globalist accounts of virtue ethics are empirically inadequate. A number of philosophers have responded to this by providing alternative explanations of subject behaviour which are consistent with the existence of global character traits. These explanations include saying subjects act badly because they experience new desires, because they have competing global character traits, because they lack practical wisdom or because they experience weakness of will. Though I don't aim to vindicate Doris, I argue that all of these explanations face important explanatory gaps. I argue a better explanation can be provided by thinking about the set and strength of subjects' perceived reasons for action.