Early in Book VI, Plato makes the love of truth the critical criterion of what it means to have the nature of a philosopher, claiming that “someone who loves learning must above all strive for every kind of truth from childhood on” (Republic 485d3-4). In this paper, I seek to explain what Plato means by “every kind of truth,” but also to defend Plato against what some scholars have seen as an inconsistency in what he has to say about philosophers and truth. Earlier in the work, Plato had already acknowledged that his philosophers will often use dishonesty in the practice of ruling: “It looks as though our rulers will have to make considerable use of falsehood and deception for the benefit of those they rule” (Republic V.459c9-d2). The problem is one that has exercised numerous scholars, and I do not pretend herein to provide either criticism or defense of Plato. Instead, my aim is to show only that there actually is a single, consistent view on truth in the Republic, and that what Plato has to say about the philosophers’ interest in truth is cogent—but also somewhat unfamiliar in contemporary philosophy.