Abstract: In this talk, I address the most pressing objection to the deliberative theory of self-knowledge: the made up minds objection. According to this objection, the deliberative theory cannot, on pain of manifest implausibility, give the same answer or similar answers to the following two questions: (i) How do I answer the question of whether I believe that P when my mind is already made up about whether to believe that P?; and (ii) How do I answer the question of whether I believe that P when my mind isn’t already made up about whether to believe that P? Since, according to the made up minds objection, any plausible theory of self-knowledge must give the same answer or similar answers to these questions, it follows that the deliberative theory is not a plausible theory. I argue that the made up minds objection fails, since no plausible theory of self-knowledge can give the same or similar answers to these questions. I then consider a follow-up objection put in terms of how I come to know whether I believe that P, rather than in terms of how I answer the question of whether I believe that P, and argue that this objection also fails, but for a different reason: the deliberative theory can give the same answer to both (i) the question of how I come to know whether I believe that P when my mind is already made up about whether to believe that P and (ii) the question of how I come to know whether I believe that P when my mind isn’t already made up about whether to believe that P. Indeed, I will suggest that it may well give the best answer to these questions.