Richard Menary
Macquarie University, Philosophy, Faculty Member
- Macquarie University, ARC Centre for Cognition and its Disorders, Faculty MemberMacquarie University, Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science, Faculty Memberadd
- Embodied Embedded Cognition, Anthropology, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, Philosophical Psychology, and 48 moreMetaphilosophy, Pragmatism, Metaphysics of Consciousness, Philosophy of Psychology, Pragmatist Aesthetics, Distributed Cognition, Situated Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Philosophy of Literature, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Extended Mind, Self (Philosophy), Evolutionary Anthropology, Epistemic Luck, Epistemic Value, Aristotle, Phenomenology, William James, Wittgenstein, Developmental Psychology, Aesthetics, Cognitive Science, Cognitive development, Subject of Experience, Mental Representation and Content, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Cognitive Integration, Charles S. Peirce, John Dewey, Embodied and Distributed Cognition, Human Evolution, Evolution, Evolution and Human Behavior, Cultural Evolution, Cognitive Neuroscience, The Self, Narrative, Narrative Theory, Extended Cognition, Evolutionary Biology, Evolutionary Psychology, Niche Construction Theory, Psychology, Cultural Psychology, Consciousness, Vygotsky, Biosemiotics, and Mental Representationedit
- I am Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy at Macquarie University Sydney. Between 2014 and 2018 I was ... moreI am Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy at Macquarie University Sydney. Between 2014 and 2018 I was an ARC Future Fellow. I read for a BA in philosophy at the University of Ulster, an MSc in Cognitive Science at the University of Birmingham and then a PhD in philosophy at King's College London. I have taught philosophy at the University of Kent, Birkbeck College Faculty of Continuing Education and as a Senior Lecturer at the University of Hertfordshire and then at the University of Wollongong.
My Research interests include:
Philosophy of Mind – especially narrative approaches to the self
Philosophy of Cognitive Science – especially embodied and extended cognition
Pragmatism - especially C.S. Peirce
Wittgenstein
Aesthetics
Virtue theory as it applies to both ethical and cognitive aspects of the individual.
I can supervise PhD theses in these areas.
My main current research interest concerns extended mind style arguments, my own take on which I call cognitive integration. According to which the real pay-off from extended mind style arguments is not a new form of externalism in the philosophy of mind, but rather a view in which the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ aspects of cognition are integrated into a whole. I argue for this thesis in my book Cognitive Integration: Mind and Cognition Unbounded.
I was the lead investigator for the Australian Research Council ‘Embodied Virtues and Expertise’ Discovery project (2010-2013) awarded $293,000. The research team includes: Prof. Shaun Gallagher, Prof. Daniel Hutto, Prof. Christopher Winch, Dr. David Simpson.edit
This book argues that thinking is bounded by neither the brain nor the skin of an organism. Cognitive systems function through integration of neural and bodily functions with the functions of representational vehicles. The integrationist... more
This book argues that thinking is bounded by neither the brain nor the skin of an organism. Cognitive systems function through integration of neural and bodily functions with the functions of representational vehicles. The integrationist position offers a fresh contribution to the emerging embodied and embedded approach to the study of mind.
Research Interests: Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Developmental Psychology, Evolutionary Psychology, Human Evolution, and 25 morePhilosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophical Psychology, Cognitive development, Philosophy of Psychology, Mental Representation, Distributed Cognition, Situated Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Situated Learning, Phenomenology, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Biosemiotics, Extended Mind, Cultural Evolution, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Vygotsky, Embodied Embedded Cognition, Enactivism, Embodied and Distributed Cognition, Evolution and Human Behavior, Cognitive Sciences, Extended Cognition, Embodied and Enactive Cognition, and Distributed Language
Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? In their famous 1998 paper “The Extended Mind,” philosophers Andy Clark and David Chalmers posed this question and answered it provocatively: cognitive processes are not all in the... more
Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? In their famous 1998 paper “The Extended Mind,” philosophers Andy Clark and David Chalmers posed this question and answered it provocatively: cognitive processes are not all in the head. The environment has an active role in driving cognition; cognition is sometimes made up of neural, bodily, and environmental processes. Their argument excited a vigorous debate among philosophers, both supporters and detractors. This volume brings together for the first time the best responses to Clark and Chalmers’ bold proposal. These responses, together with the original paper by Clark and Chalmers, offer a valuable overview of the latest research on the extended mind thesis.
The contributors first discuss (and answer) objections raised to Clark and Chalmers’s thesis. Andy Clark himself responds to critics in a paper that uses the movie Memento’s amnesia-aiding notes and tattoos to illustrate the workings of the extended mind. Contributors then consider the different directions in which the extended mind project might be taken, including the need for an approach that focuses on cognitive activity and practice.
Contributors
Fred Adams, Ken Aizawa, David Chalmers, Andy Clark, Stephen Cowley, Susan Hurley, James Ladyman, Richard Menary, John Preston, Don Ross, Mark Rowlands, Robert D. Rupert, David Spurrett, John Sutton, Michael Wheeler, Rob A. Wilson
Richard Menary is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Wollongong. He is the author of Cognitive Integration and the Philosophy of Cognition.
The contributors first discuss (and answer) objections raised to Clark and Chalmers’s thesis. Andy Clark himself responds to critics in a paper that uses the movie Memento’s amnesia-aiding notes and tattoos to illustrate the workings of the extended mind. Contributors then consider the different directions in which the extended mind project might be taken, including the need for an approach that focuses on cognitive activity and practice.
Contributors
Fred Adams, Ken Aizawa, David Chalmers, Andy Clark, Stephen Cowley, Susan Hurley, James Ladyman, Richard Menary, John Preston, Don Ross, Mark Rowlands, Robert D. Rupert, David Spurrett, John Sutton, Michael Wheeler, Rob A. Wilson
Richard Menary is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Wollongong. He is the author of Cognitive Integration and the Philosophy of Cognition.
Research Interests: Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Developmental Psychology, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, and 9 moreMemory (Cognitive Psychology), Philosophy of Psychology, Distributed Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Extended Mind, Embodied Embedded Cognition, Extended Cognition, and Distributed Language
We propose an account of cognitive tools that takes into account the process of enculturation by which tools are integrated into our cognitive systems. Drawing on work in cultural evolution and developmental psychology, we argue that... more
We propose an account of cognitive tools that takes into account the process of enculturation by which tools are integrated into our cognitive systems. Drawing on work in cultural evolution and developmental psychology, we argue that cognitive tools are complex entities consisting of physical objects, representational systems, and cognitive practices for the physical manipulation of the tool. We use an extensive case study of spatial navigation to demonstrate the core claims. The account we provide is contrasted with conceptions of cognitive tools that simplify cognition, in particular that they offload cognitive work, or that the tools themselves are temporary developmental scaffolds or props. Enculturation results in transformed cognitive systems, and we can now think and act in new ways with cognitive tools.
Research Interests:
Humans look at, think about and manipulate things with tools. Some tools are largely pragmatic in nature, and they have a long history in our lineage, but more recently humans have innovated tools for keeping track of features of the... more
Humans look at, think about and manipulate things with tools. Some tools are largely pragmatic in nature, and they have a long history in our lineage, but more recently humans have innovated tools for keeping track of features of the environment. Epistemic tracking tools (as I shall dub them) allow us to think, perceive and manipulate the world with a precision that we would otherwise lack (Dennett 1996, Norman 1991, Hutchins 2005, Menary 2007)2. It is these epistemic tracking tools (henceforth ETTs) that will be the focus of this chapter. ETTs track particular environmental variables examples of such tools include: maps, compasses telescopes, sextants, and so on. There are also abstract systems of representation that track numbers, sets, sounds and phonemes, and collectively as sets of propositions and equations can track physical phenomena, or perhaps even the truth. This chapter will focus on providing an account of the evolutionary platform for ETTs, look at some examples of ETTs in action and look at some of the consequences of the account for the extended knowledge literature.
Research Interests:
This chapter examines the pragmatist approach to cognition and experience and provides some of the conceptual background to the " pragmatic turn " currently underway in cognitive science. Classical pragmatists wrote extensively on... more
This chapter examines the pragmatist approach to cognition and experience and provides some of the conceptual background to the " pragmatic turn " currently underway in cognitive science. Classical pragmatists wrote extensively on cognition from a natural-istic perspective, and many of their views are compatible with contemporary pragmatist approaches such as enactivist, extended, and embodied-Bayesian approaches to cogni-tion. Three principles of a pragmatic approach to cognition frame the discussion: First, thinking is structured by the interaction of an organism with its environment. Second, cognition develops via exploratory inference, which remains a core cognitive ability throughout the life cycle. Finally, inquiry/problem solving begins with genuinely irritating doubts that arise in a situation and is carried out by exploratory inference. (Pre-print version some typos)
Citation details: Menary 2016 Pragmatism and the Pragmatic Turn in Engel, A. K., K. J. Friston, and D. Kragic, eds. 2016. The Pragmatic Turn: Toward Action-Oriented Views in Cognitive Science. Strüngmann Forum Reports, vol. 18. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016.
Citation details: Menary 2016 Pragmatism and the Pragmatic Turn in Engel, A. K., K. J. Friston, and D. Kragic, eds. 2016. The Pragmatic Turn: Toward Action-Oriented Views in Cognitive Science. Strüngmann Forum Reports, vol. 18. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016.
Research Interests: Cognitive Science, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophical Psychology, Pragmatism, and 18 moreCognition, Distributed Cognition, Situated Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Social Cognition, Situated Learning, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Extended Mind, Charles S. Peirce, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Pragmatism (Philosophy), Enactivism, Peircean Semiotics, American Pragmatism, Enculturation, Embodied and Enactive Cognition, Cognitive Integration, and Enculturated cognition
Chapter XI of The Extended Mind ed. Richard Menary 2010 MIT Press.
Research Interests: Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophical Psychology, Cognition, and 10 moreDistributed Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Extended Mind, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Extended Cognition, Embodied knowledge, Embodied and Enactive Cognition, Cognitive Integration, and Embodied, Situaded, Extended and Enactive Cognition and Affection (VTR and O&R Versions)
Regina Fabry has proposed an intriguing marriage of enculturated cognition and predictive processing. I raise some questions for whether this marriage will work and warn against expecting too much from the predictive processing framework.... more
Regina Fabry has proposed an intriguing marriage of enculturated cognition and predictive processing. I raise some questions for whether this marriage will work and warn against expecting too much from the predictive processing framework. Furthermore I argue that the predictive processes at a sub-personal level cannot be driving the innovations at a social level that lead to enculturated cognitive systems, like those explored in my target paper.
Research Interests: Cognitive Science, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophical Psychology, Cognition, and 15 moreDistributed Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Extended Mind, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Cognitive Neuroscience, Culture and Cognition, Philosophy of cognitive neuroscience, Mathematical Cognition, Extended Cognition, Predictive coding, Enculturation, Embodied and Enactive Cognition, Enculturation. Materiality of Writing, and Mathematics Enculturation
Most thinking about cognition proceeds on the assumption that we are born with our primary cognitive faculties intact and they simply need to mature, or be fine-tuned by learning mechanisms. Alternatively, a growing number of thinkers are... more
Most thinking about cognition proceeds on the assumption that we are born with our primary cognitive faculties intact and they simply need to mature, or be fine-tuned by learning mechanisms. Alternatively, a growing number of thinkers are aligning themselves to the view that a process of enculturation transforms our basic biological faculties. What evidence is there for this process of enculturation? A long period of development, learning-driven plasticity, and a cultural environment suffused with practices, symbols, and complex social interactions all speak in its favour. In this paper I will sketch in outline the commitments of the enculturated approach and then look at the case of mathematical cognition as a central example of enculturation. I will then defend the account against several objections.
Research Interests: Neuroscience, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Evolutionary Psychology, Human Evolution, and 27 morePhilosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy Of Mathematics, Mathematics Education, Cognitive development, Cultural Transmission (Evolutionary Biology), Philosophy of Psychology, Distributed Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Philosophy of Mathematics Education, Extended Mind, Cultural Evolution, Brain and Cognitive Development, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Social learning, Embodied Embedded Cognition, Cognitive Neuroscience, Niche Construction Theory, Enactivism, Evolution and Human Behavior, Mathematical Cognition, Development of early mathematical skills, Extended Cognition, Embodied knowledge, Embodied and Enactive Cognition, and Embodied/embedded/enactivist Approaches to the Self
To appear in the British Journal of Aesthetics. Niche constructionist account of the origin of art.
Research Interests:
In Reading in the Brain, Stanislas Dehaene presents a compelling account of how the brain learns to read. Central to this account is his neuronal recycling hypothesis: neural circuitry is capable of being ‘recycled’ or converted to a... more
In Reading in the Brain, Stanislas Dehaene presents a compelling account of how the brain learns to read. Central to this account is his neuronal recycling hypothesis: neural circuitry is capable of being ‘recycled’ or converted to a different function that is cultural in nature. The original function of the circuitry is not entirely lost and
constrains what the brain can learn. It is argued that the neural niche co-evolves with the environmental niche in a way that does not undermine the core ideas of neuronal recycling, but which is quite different from the models of cognitive and cultural evolution
provided by evolutionary psychology and epidemiology. Dehaene contrasts neuronal recycling with a naïve model of the brain as a general learning device that is unconstrained in what it can learn. Consequently a tension develops in Dehaene’s account of the role of plasticity in the acquisition of language. It is argued that the functional and structural changes in the brain that Dehaene documents in great detail are driven by learning and that this learning-driven plasticity does not commit us to a naïve model of the brain.
constrains what the brain can learn. It is argued that the neural niche co-evolves with the environmental niche in a way that does not undermine the core ideas of neuronal recycling, but which is quite different from the models of cognitive and cultural evolution
provided by evolutionary psychology and epidemiology. Dehaene contrasts neuronal recycling with a naïve model of the brain as a general learning device that is unconstrained in what it can learn. Consequently a tension develops in Dehaene’s account of the role of plasticity in the acquisition of language. It is argued that the functional and structural changes in the brain that Dehaene documents in great detail are driven by learning and that this learning-driven plasticity does not commit us to a naïve model of the brain.
Research Interests: Neuroscience, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Neuropsychology, Evolutionary Psychology, and 25 moreHuman Evolution, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Psychology, Cognition, Distributed Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Embodiment, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Reading, History of Reading and Writing, Extended Mind, Brain and Cognitive Development, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Social learning, Cognitive Neuroscience, Niche Construction Theory, Neural Basis of Cognitive Plasticity, Philosophy of cognitive neuroscience, Evolution and Human Behavior, Teaching and Learning Writing and Reading, Extended Cognition, Neural plasticity, Reading Strategies and Cognition, and Stanislas Dehaene
Research Interests:
Research Interests: Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Developmental Psychology, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, and 16 moreAnalytic Philosophy, Philosophical Psychology, Philosophy of Psychology, Mental Representation, Embodied Cognition, Phenomenology, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Continental Philosophy, Consciousness, Extended Mind, Intentionality, Mental Representation and Content, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Cognitive Neuroscience, Extended Cognition, and History of Philosophy
Research Interests: Evolutionary Biology, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Evolutionary Psychology, Human Evolution, and 29 morePhilosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science, Philosophical Psychology, Philosophical Anthropology, Evolutionary Dynamics in Brains generating Thought, Cognition, Distributed Cognition, Situated Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Phenomenology, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Evolutionary Anthropology, Biosemiotics, Extended Mind, Cultural Evolution, Animal Cognition, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Cognitive Anthropology, Phenotypic Plasticity, Cognitive Neuroscience, Niche Construction Theory, Embodied and Distributed Cognition, Evolution and Human Behavior, Cognitive Sciences, Extended Cognition, Embodied and Enactive Cognition, Distributed Language, and Cognitive Integration
Research Interests: Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Human Evolution, Philosophy, and 25 morePhilosophy of Mind, Philosophical Psychology, Philosophical Anthropology, Social and Cultural Anthropology, Philosophy of Psychology, Distributed Cognition, Situated Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Cultural Psychology, Phenomenology, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Neurophilosophy, Biosemiotics, Extended Mind, Cultural Evolution, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Cultural Anthropology, Enactivism, Evolution and Human Behavior, Neuroplasticity, Cognitive Sciences, Extended Cognition, Embodied and Enactive Cognition, Distributed Language, and Cognitive Integration
Research Interests: Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Developmental Psychology, Human Evolution, and 19 morePhilosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Pragmatism, Education, Expertise, Philosophy of Education, Educational Psychology, Philosophy of Psychology, Distributed Cognition, Situated Cognition, Situated Learning, Cultural Psychology, Extended Mind, Cultural Evolution, Situated learning (Learning And Teaching), Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Cognitive Neuroscience, Enactivism, and Distributed Language
Research Interests: Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Evolutionary Psychology, Human Evolution, and 28 morePhilosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophical Psychology, Pragmatism, Philosophical Anthropology, Evolutionary Dynamics in Brains generating Thought, Philosophy of Psychology, Distributed Cognition, Situated Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Cultural Psychology, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Neurophilosophy, Biosemiotics, Extended Mind, Cultural Evolution, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Phenotypic Plasticity, Cognitive Neuroscience, Niche Construction Theory, Enactivism, Neural Basis of Cognitive Plasticity, Philosophy of cognitive neuroscience, Evolution and Human Behavior, Philosophy of Neuroscience, Neural plasticity, Distributed Language, and Cognitive Integration
Research Interests:
Research Interests: Cognitive Science, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, Pragmatism, and 26 moreDistributed Cognition, Situated Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Situated Learning, Phenomenology, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Biosemiotics, Extended Mind, Charles S. Peirce, John Dewey, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Virtue Epistemology, Embodied Embedded Cognition, Enaction (Psychology), Enactivism, Embodied and Distributed Cognition, Cognitive Sciences, Extended Cognition, Enaction, Enactive cognition, Situated Knowledge, Embodied knowledge, Embodied and Enactive Cognition, Distributed Language, Cognitive Integration, and Situated Epistemology
Chapter 1 of Cognitive Integration, Richard Menary, 2007 Palsgrave Macmillan.
Research Interests: Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Psychology, and 10 moreDistributed Cognition, Situated Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Extended Mind, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Internalism/Externalism, Enactivism, Cognitivism, and Cognitive Integration
Introduction to the Extended Mind Volume.
Research Interests: Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Human Evolution, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, and 26 morePhilosophical Psychology, Philosophical Anthropology, Distributed Cognition, Situated Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Phenomenology, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Neurophilosophy, Biosemiotics, Neuroethics, Extended Mind, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Embodied Embedded Cognition, Enaction (Psychology), Enactivism, Embodied and Distributed Cognition, Evolution and Human Behavior, Neuroplasticity, Cognitive Sciences, Extended Cognition, Enaction, Enactive cognition, Embodied knowledge, Embodied and Enactive Cognition, Distributed Language, and Cognitive Integration
Research Interests:
Research Interests: Philosophy, Epistemology, Pragmatism, Philosophical Scepticism, American Philosophy, and 17 morePeirce, Charles S. Peirce, Wittgenstein, John Dewey, Later Wittgenstein, Richard Rorty, Process Philosophy (Peirce, Whitehead), Pragmatism (Philosophy), Peirce Pragmaticist Semiotics, Philosophical skepticism, Epistemology, Pragmatism and Practice, Charles Sanders Peirce, Peircean Semiotics, American Pragmatism, NeoPragmatism, Media and Technology, and Wittgenstein's On Certainty
Research Interests:
The classical pragmatists––Peirce, James Dewey, and Mead––all had important things to say about the self and there are clear continuities in their thought. Since little work has been done to connect them up, in this chapter I trace these... more
The classical pragmatists––Peirce, James Dewey, and Mead––all had important things to say about the self and there are clear continuities in their thought. Since little work has been done to connect them up, in this chapter I trace these continuities and begin to assemble a picture of a pragmatist conception of the self. The picture that emerges is strikingly modern and original and has much to offer contemporary accounts of the self.
Research Interests: Semiotics, Cognitive Science, Developmental Psychology, Emotion, Philosophy, and 54 moreMetaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science, Metaphilosophy, Pragmatism, Self and Identity, Personal Narrative (Social and Cultural Anthropology), American Philosophy, Peirce, Distributed Cognition, Situated Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Situated Learning, Phenomenology, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Self-regulated Learning, William James, Dewey, Emotional Development, Consciousness, Biosemiotics, The Self, Technologies of the Self, Extended Mind, Intersubjectivity, Charles S. Peirce, Social Developmental Psychology, John Dewey, Phenomenology of the body, Narrative and Identity, Richard Rorty, Personal Identity, Process Philosophy (Peirce, Whitehead), Pragmatism (Philosophy), George Herbert Mead, Embodied Embedded Cognition, Peirce Pragmaticist Semiotics, Self Identity, Enactivism, Charles Sanders Peirce, Peircean Semiotics, Cognitive Sciences, American Pragmatism, Dialogical Self Theory, Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, C. S. Peirce, NeoPragmatism, Classical American Pragmatism, Media and Technology, Embodied and Enactive Cognition, Distributed Language, Mirror Neuron Systems, Early Attachment, and Embodied/embedded/enactivist Approaches to the Self
Research Interests:
In their papers for this issue, Sterelny and Sutton provide a dimensional analysis of some of the ways in which mental and cognitive activities take place in the world. I add two further dimensions, a dimension of manipulation and of... more
In their papers for this issue, Sterelny and Sutton provide a dimensional analysis of some of the ways in which mental and cognitive activities take place in the world. I add two further dimensions, a dimension of manipulation and of transformation. I also discuss the explanatory dimensions that we might use to explain these cases.
Research Interests: Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Philosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, and 23 morePhilosophy of Science, Metaphilosophy, Philosophy of Psychology, Creative Problem Solving, Distributed Cognition, Situated Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Phenomenology, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Problem solving (Cognitive Psychology), Consciousness, Extended Mind, Normativity, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Personal Identity, Embodied Embedded Cognition, Cognitive Neuroscience, Embodied and Distributed Cognition, Cognitive Sciences, Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, Extended Cognition, Embodied and Enactive Cognition, and Cognitive Integration
Adams and Aizawa (2010b) define cognitivism as the processing of representations with underived content. In this paper, I respond to their use of this stipulative definition of cognition. I look at the plausibility of Adams and Aizawa’s... more
Adams and Aizawa (2010b) define cognitivism as the processing of representations with underived content. In this paper, I respond to their use of this stipulative definition of cognition. I look at the plausibility of Adams and Aizawa’s cognitivism, taking into account that they have no criteria for cognitive representation and no naturalistic theory of content determination. This is a glaring hole in their cognitivism—which requires both a theory of representation and underived content to be successful. I also explain why my own position, cognitive integration, is not susceptible to the supposed causal-coupling fallacy. Finally, I look at the more interesting question of whether the distinction between derived and underived content is important for cognition. Given Adams and Aizawa’s concession that there is no difference in content between derived and underived representations (only a difference in how they get their content) I conclude that the distinction is not important and show that there is empirical research which does not respect the distinction.
Research Interests: Cognitive Science, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophical Psychology, Philosophy of Psychology, and 14 moreMental Representation, Distributed Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Biosemiotics, Extended Mind, Mental Representation and Content, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Semantic Internalism, Embodied Embedded Cognition, Internalism/Externalism, Embodied and Distributed Cognition, Distributed Language, and Cognitive Integration
"Is the self narratively constructed? There are many who would answer yes to the question. Dennett (1991) is, perhaps, the most famous proponent of the view that the self is narratively constructed, but there are others, such as Velleman... more
"Is the self narratively constructed? There are many who would answer yes to the question. Dennett (1991) is, perhaps, the most famous proponent of the view that the self is narratively constructed, but there are others, such as Velleman (2006), who have followed his lead and developed the view much further. Indeed, the importance of narrative to understanding the mind and the self is currently being lavished with attention across the cognitive sciences (Dautenhahn, 2001; Hutto, 2007; Nelson, 2003). Emerging from this work, there appear to be a
variety of ways in which we can think of the narrative construction of the self and the relationship between the narrative self and the embodied agent. I wish to examine two such ways in this paper. The first I shall call the abstract narrative account, this is because its proponents take the
narrative self to be an abstraction (Dennett, 1991; Velleman, 2006). Dennett, for example, refers to the self as a centre of narrative gravity, to be thought of as analogous to a mathematical conception of the centre of gravity of an object. The second I shall call the embodied narrative account and this is the view that the self is constituted both by an embodied consciousness whose experiences are available for narration and narratives themselves, which can play a variety of roles in the agent’s psychological life."
variety of ways in which we can think of the narrative construction of the self and the relationship between the narrative self and the embodied agent. I wish to examine two such ways in this paper. The first I shall call the abstract narrative account, this is because its proponents take the
narrative self to be an abstraction (Dennett, 1991; Velleman, 2006). Dennett, for example, refers to the self as a centre of narrative gravity, to be thought of as analogous to a mathematical conception of the centre of gravity of an object. The second I shall call the embodied narrative account and this is the view that the self is constituted both by an embodied consciousness whose experiences are available for narration and narratives themselves, which can play a variety of roles in the agent’s psychological life."
Research Interests: Cognitive Science, Developmental Psychology, Emotion, Psychiatry, Philosophy, and 35 moreMetaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science, Philosophical Psychology, Metaphilosophy, Self and Identity, Mental Health, Narrative, Philosophy of Psychology, Social Interaction, Phenomenology, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Narratology, Personhood, Emotional Development, Consciousness, The Self, Technologies of the Self, Performances of self and society, Intersubjectivity, Social Developmental Psychology, Personal Identity, Vygotsky, Self Identity, Narrativity, Dialogical Self Theory, Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, Motherhood, Parenthood, Moral Practice, The Combination of Interaction (Narrativity), Structuralism (Social Theory), Mirror Neuron Systems, Early Attachment, and Embodied/embedded/enactivist Approaches to the Self
In this paper I aim to show that the creation and manipulation of written vehicles is part of our cognitive processing and, therefore, that writing transforms our cognitive abilities. I do this from the perspective of cognitive... more
In this paper I aim to show that the creation and manipulation of written vehicles is part of our cognitive processing and, therefore, that writing transforms our cognitive abilities. I do this from the perspective of cognitive integration: completing a complex cognitive, or mental, task is enabled by a co-ordinated interaction between neural processes, bodily processes and manipulating written sentences. In section one I introduce Harris’ criticisms of ways in which writing has been said to restructure thought (Goody 1968; McLuhan 1962, 1964; Ong 1982). This will give us a preliminary idea about possible pitfalls for a cognitive integrationist account. The second section outlines, firstly, how integrated cognitive systems function. Secondly, the model is applied to a hybrid mental act where writing allows us to complete complex cognitive tasks. The final section outlines the sense in which, following Harris, there is “a more realistic picture of how writing restructures thought” [Harris, R., 1989. How does writing restructure thought? Language and Communication 9 (2/3) 99–106] that is concealed by the ‘romantic fantasies’ of theorists such as the above. This picture is one of writing providing an autoglottic space in which a new form of theoretical thinking becomes prevalent. The cognitive integrationist understands this in terms of the nature of the written vehicles and how we manipulate them
Research Interests: Discourse Analysis, Semiotics, Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, and 46 moreDevelopmental Psychology, Philosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science, Metaphilosophy, Phonology, Phonetics, Pragmatics, Semantics, Sociolinguistics, Educational Psychology, Philosophy of Psychology, Cultural Semiotics, Distributed Cognition, Situated Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Situated Learning, Phenomenology, Embodied Mind and Cognition, TESOL, Syntax, Applied Linguistics, Consciousness, Biosemiotics, Extended Mind, Morphology, Embodied Memory, Cognitive Semiotics, Cognitive Linguistics, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Linguistics, Personal Identity, English Grammar, ESP, Embodied Embedded Cognition, Peirce Pragmaticist Semiotics, Embodied and Distributed Cognition, Peircean Semiotics, Cognitive Sciences, Research Writing, Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, Arabic-English translation, Embodied and Enactive Cognition, Distributed Language, and Cognitive Integration
Naturalistic philosophers ought to think that the mind is continuous with the rest of the world and should not, therefore, be surprised by the findings of the extended mind, cognitive integration and enactivism. Not everyone is convinced... more
Naturalistic philosophers ought to think that the mind is continuous with the rest of the world and should not, therefore, be surprised by the findings of the extended mind, cognitive integration and enactivism. Not everyone is convinced that all mental phenomena are continuous with the rest of the world. For example, intentionality is often formulated in a way that makes the mind discontinuous with the rest of the world. This is a consequence of Brentano’s formulation of intentionality, I suggest, and can be overcome by revealing that the concept of intentional directedness as he receives it from the Scholastics is quite consistent with the continuity thesis. It is only when intentional directedness is conjoined with intentional inexistence that intentionality and content are consistent with a discontinuity thesis (such as Brentano’s thesis). This makes room to develop an account of intentional directedness that is consistent with the continuity thesis in the form of Peirce’s representational principle. I also argue against a form of the discontinuity thesis in the guise of the derived/underived content distinction. Having shown that intentionality is consistent with the continuity thesis I argue that we should focus on intentionality and representation as bodily enacted. I conclude that we would be better off focussing on representation and intentionality in action rather than giving abstract functional accounts of extended cognition.
Research Interests: Semiotics, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Human Evolution, Philosophy, and 32 moreMetaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science, Metaphilosophy, Philosophy of Psychology, Mental Representation, Distributed Cognition, Situated Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Phenomenological Psychology, Phenomenology, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Consciousness, Biosemiotics, Extended Mind, Intentionality, Mental Representation and Content, Cognitive Semiotics, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Personal Identity, Embodied Mind Theory, Embodied Embedded Cognition, Peirce Pragmaticist Semiotics, Enactivism, Embodied and Distributed Cognition, Evolution and Human Behavior, Peircean Semiotics, Cognitive Sciences, Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, Embodied and Enactive Cognition, Distributed Language, and Cognitive Integration
"Recently internalists have mounted a counter-attack on the attempt to redefine the bounds of cognition. The counter-attack is aimed at a radical project which I call ‘‘cognitive integration,’’ which is the view that internal and external... more
"Recently internalists have mounted a counter-attack on the attempt to redefine the bounds of cognition. The counter-attack is aimed at a radical project which I call ‘‘cognitive integration,’’ which is the view that internal and external vehicles and
processes are integrated into a whole. Cognitive integration can be defended against the internalist counter arguments of Adams and Aizawa (A&A) and Rupert. The disagreement between internalists and integrationists is whether the manipulation of external vehicles constitutes a cognitive process. Integrationists think that they do, typically for reasons to do with the close coordination and causal interplay between internal and external processes. The internalist criticisms of the manipulation thesis fail because they misconstrue the nature of manipulation, ignore the hybrid nature of cognition, and take the manipulation thesis to be dependent upon a weak parity principle."
processes are integrated into a whole. Cognitive integration can be defended against the internalist counter arguments of Adams and Aizawa (A&A) and Rupert. The disagreement between internalists and integrationists is whether the manipulation of external vehicles constitutes a cognitive process. Integrationists think that they do, typically for reasons to do with the close coordination and causal interplay between internal and external processes. The internalist criticisms of the manipulation thesis fail because they misconstrue the nature of manipulation, ignore the hybrid nature of cognition, and take the manipulation thesis to be dependent upon a weak parity principle."