Hermeneutical Overwriting and the Epistemic Conditions of Autonomy
Natalie Stoljar and Nicole Ramsoomair McGill University
Autonomy can be undermined if the epistemic conditions of autonomy are undermined, or if other conditions of autonomy are undermined. According to Miranda Fricker and others, ‘hermeneutical injustice’ is an epistemic wrong: there are ‘lacunae in the collective hermeneutical resource’ that are the result of unequal participation in ‘practices by which collective social meanings are generated’ (Fricker 2007, 152). Does hermeneutical injustice undermine either epistemic or other conditions of autonomy? Our first argument is that the ‘hermeneutical gaps’ identified by Fricker need not and typically do not undermine the epistemic conditions of autonomy. They do not typically undermine the knowledge/self-knowledge of members of marginalized groups, or render them ‘informationally cut off.’ However, agents may be blocked by hermeneutical gaps from making contributions to the pool of knowledge. Hermeneutical gaps may also interfere with the self-regarding attitudes necessary for both epistemic and autonomous agency. Our second argument is that hermeneutical injustice is not limited to hermeneutical gaps. What we call hermeneutical overwriting is both an epistemic harm and a harm to autonomy: it interferes with agents’ status as knowers by blocking their contributions to the spread of knowledge and interferes with their autonomy by overriding the communicative acts that agents intend to perform.
When
Wed Aug 23, 2017 3am – 4:30am Coordinated Universal Time
