Abstract: How should we account for the extraordinary regularity in the world? Humeans and non-Humeans sharply disagree. Non-Humeans typically think that there must be some fundamental modal element to reality, which in some way guarantees this extraordinary regularity. Perhaps there are fundamental laws, powers, necessitation relations, or counterfactuals which necessitate the regularity in the world. Humeans are skeptical of any such modal primitives. Anything that guarantees necessary connections between wholly distinct entities is metaphysically suspect. By way of reply, non-Humeans object that Humeans have no way of accounting for the regularity in the world. Both sides of the debate have powerful objections to the other side. What are we to believe? I will argue that there is a single view which can accommodate the core insights of both Humeans and non-Humeans. Instead of picking sides, we should be Humean Non-Humeans.​