Blameworthiness and Obligation in Non-Agent Groups
What's the moral status of groups that are not agents -- groups like 'carbon emitters', 'the international community', or 'upholders of patriarchy'? This paper will argue that groups that are not agents cannot have obligations, but that they can beblameworthy. This unlikely pair of conclusions arises because of the different functions that obligations and blameworthiness play in our moral and political practices. Obligations function as inputs into the practical deliberation of the entity that bears the obligation. Groups that are not agents cannot reason, so they cannot have obligations. By contrast, blameworthiness functions as a reflection of the esteem or disesteem with which others (should) hold the blameworthy entity. Non-group agent groups are -- sometimes -- appropriate objects of esteem or disesteem. I give conditions under which non-agent groups are irreducibly blameworthy.
When
Wed May 2, 2018 3am – 4:30am Coordinated Universal Time
