Abstract: Panpsychism is the view that mentality is ubiquitous and that our minds are combinations of the many smaller minds. One major objection posited to this view is the combination problem, which states that many minds cannot combine to form a another mind. Angela Mendelovici (forthcoming) argues that the combination problem applies to all theories of mind. If true, then panpsychists are in a much better dialectical position, or the philosophy of mind has considerably more work to do, or both. In this paper, I will assess whether it is right to claim that dualists, physicalists, and panpsychists have combination problems and whether they can be considered as equally problematic and difficult to solve. I will argue that at least physicalists have ways to refute combination problems by appealing to different standard of constitution for experience. Therein, I argue that Mendelovici’s arguments do not vindicate panpsychism but do suggest constraints on our accounts of the constitution of experience.