Abstract: In this paper I consider whether ought implies can in epistemology. A number of epistemologists take it as a desideratum of their theorising that the insights of their work will be applicable to actual thinkers’ doxastic lives. That is, many theorists hold that there is something fundamentally normative about epistemology, and it ought to issue in some sort of guidance or implementable advice for real people deliberating about what to believe. In this paper I consider whether such an attitude necessarily amounts to endorsing an ought implies can principle for epistemology. I suggest the answer depends on what concept is expressed by the can relatum of the principle. I consider three different senses of an epistemic can - a metaphysical can, a voluntaristic can, and a psychological can - and argue that each importantly changes both the content and plausibility of a epistemic ought implies can principle.
When | Thu May 24, 2018 5am – 6:30am Coordinated Universal Time |
Where | Muniment Room, University of Sydney (map) |