Lacking the Will to be Good – Iris Murdoch and Aristotle on Virtue
Iris Murdoch was a self-described Platonist, but in this paper I will draw on similarities between her theory of virtue and Aristotle’s, to bring Murdoch’s work into conversation with contemporary (neo-Aristotelian) virtue ethics and, if all goes to plan, the (meta)ethics of care. By focussing on three aspects of Murdoch’s philosophy, I hope to elucidate the ways in which her work can be positioned as a link between these two moral theories. I begin with a discussion of the role the will plays – or doesn’t play – in being good from Murdoch’s and Aristotle’s perspectives. I then discuss the importance of love and the central role of attention in moral life. Both Murdoch’s Platonism and her focus on the mystical can be a source of scholarly discomfort (cf Broakes 2012: Murdoch’s mysticism must be “grounded, deflated, and rendered innocent” p. 30). Rather than ‘deflate’ or denude these aspects of her thought, I will try to incorporate or develop them. Murdoch’s focus on beauty in nature (and art), experiences of the sublime, and the ego-rending experience of love are all central to her view of being good. According to Murdoch, and as we find in Aristotle, being good is not established by a discrete decision made at a particular time, but in a habitual way of perceiving the real world and acting upon those perceptions. Being good is not a matter of will, but of vision.
When
Thu Mar 12, 2020 4am – 5:30am Coordinated Universal Time
