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John Lippitt
  • Institute for Ethics and Society
    University of Notre Dame Australia
    P.O. Box 944
    Broadway NSW 2007
    Australia.
  • John Lippitt is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame Australia and the University of Pardubice. ... moreedit
Preface and Chapter 1 posted here with kind permission of Oxford University Press. Love's Forgiveness combines a discussion of the nature and ethics of forgiveness with a discussion—inspired by Kierkegaard—of the implications of... more
Preface and Chapter 1 posted here with kind permission of Oxford University Press.

Love's Forgiveness combines a discussion of the nature and ethics of forgiveness with a discussion—inspired by Kierkegaard—of the implications of considering interpersonal forgiveness as a 'work of love'. It introduces the reader to some key questions that have exercised recent philosophers of forgiveness, discussing the relationship between forgiveness and an extended notion of resentment; considering whether forgiveness should be conditional or unconditional (showcasing a particular understanding of the latter); and arguing that there are legitimate forms of third party forgiveness. It then introduces the idea of forgiveness as a work of love through a discussion of Kierkegaard, key New Testament passages on forgiveness, and some recent work on the philosophy of love.

Drawing on both philosophy and the New Testament, John Lippitt offers an understanding of forgiveness that incorporates both agapic love and a proper concern for justice. Lippitt explores religious and secular uses of key metaphors for forgiveness, and the idea of forgivingness as a virtue. He suggests that seeking to correct for various cognitive biases is key to the development of such a virtue, and connects it to other virtues, such as humility and hope. He draws on both Kierkegaard's discourse literature and contemporary philosophical work on these latter characteristics, before turning to a discussion of the nature of self-forgiveness. Throughout the book, the philosophical and theological literature is rooted in a discussion of various 'forgiveness narratives', including Helen Prejean's Dead Man Walking, Thordis Elva and Tom Stranger's South of Forgiveness, and Ian McEwan's Atonement.
Now published: a second (updated and expanded) edition of this book for the Routledge Guides to the Great Books series. Available now! Attached is the text of the Contents and the Preface to the Second Edition (which explains some of the... more
Now published: a second (updated and expanded) edition of this book for the Routledge Guides to the Great Books series. Available now!

Attached is the text of the Contents and the Preface to the Second Edition (which explains some of the more significant changes made from the first edition). Material placed here with kind permission of Routledge.

Endorsements:

‘This is an excellent text. Lippitt gives due consideration to all parts of Fear and Trembling, including the early sections that are often neglected, and provides an insightful account and critical evaluation of the various ways in which Kierkegaard’s notorious book has been interpreted.’ - Rick Anthony Furtak, Colorado College, USA

'A first-rate Kierkegaard scholar, Lippitt has a gift for conveying complex and difficult ideas in a clear, accessible way, which makes this book an ideal guide for undergraduate students and for other readers coming to Kierkegaard for the first time.' - David Law, University of Manchester, UK

‘John Lippitt is one of the top experts on Fear and Trembling in the English-speaking world. The many insights of his work are distilled here in a form that is accessible to undergraduates, yet also thought-provoking for more advanced scholars. This book is essential for any serious reader of Kierkegaard!’ - John Davenport, Fordham University, USA

Comments  on the first edition:

"[A]mazingly comprehensive and very ably written ... required reading for anyone doing graduate work on Kierkegaard. Even well-established scholars will find it an invaluable resource." - M. G. Piety, Teaching Philosophy.

"This is an excellent piece of work ... brings out the full range of [Fear and Trembling's] implications for moral philosophy and philosophy of religion." - Stephen Mulhall, University of Oxford.

"John Lippitt manages to capture the brightness and excitement of Kierkegaard's remarkable work while explicating its themes with depth and insight. One every page one finds eye-opening clues and interpretations ... a treasure" - Charles Guignon, University of South Florida."
'Are our lives enacted dramatic narratives? Did Kierkegaard understand human existence in these terms? Anyone grappling with these two questions will find in these excellent essays a remarkable catalogue of insights and arguments to be... more
'Are our lives enacted dramatic narratives? Did Kierkegaard understand human existence in these terms? Anyone grappling with these two questions will find in these excellent essays a remarkable catalogue of insights and arguments to be reckoned with in giving an answer. That is no small achievement.'
                                                      Professor Alasdair MacIntyre

Are selves stories? Is each of us the main character in a narrative we tell about ourselves? Are selves and persons the same thing, or is each of us somehow both these things? What implications does the possibility of sudden death have our ability to understand ourselves in narrative terms? Or is this increasingly popular narrative approach to self-constitution misguided, and possibly harmful? These questions have been heavily discussed in recent analytic philosophy of personal identity, and also by scholars grappling with Kierkegaard’s distinctive account of selfhood and ethical identity (and with Heidegger, whose work on self, death, and time bears an unmistakably Kierkegaardian imprint). This collection brings together, for the first time, figures working in each of these fields, to explore pressing issues in the philosophy of personal identity and moral psychology. It serves both to advance important ongoing discussions and to explore the light that, two hundred years after his birth, Kierkegaard is still able to shed on contemporary problems.
This work, the first book-length study of self-love in Kierkegaard’s thought, develops a conception of proper self-love inspired by - but in some respects critical of - Kierkegaard. As well as offering a detailed engagement with Works of... more
This work, the first book-length study of self-love in Kierkegaard’s thought, develops a conception of proper self-love inspired by - but in some respects critical of - Kierkegaard. As well as offering a detailed engagement with Works of Love, related Kierkegaard texts and some important recent studies of the Danish thinker, the book addresses a wealth of wider literature in ethics, moral psychology and philosophy of religion. It relates the question of what it means to love oneself properly to such topics as love of God and neighbour, friendship, romantic love, self-denial and self-sacrifice, trust, hope and forgiveness. In doing so, it also engages with such thinkers as Aristotle, Erich Fromm, Emmanuel Levinas, Paul Ricoeur, Harry Frankfurt, Robert M. Adams, Thomas Hill, Annette Baier and Robin S. Dillon.

Sample chapter attached, with kind permission of Cambridge University Press.

Endorsements:

‘This is the most important book on Kierkegaard and love to appear since Jamie Ferreira's classic Love's Grateful Striving; in particular, it offers the most detailed treatment available on the notion of proper self-love in Works of Love. This work also brings Kierkegaard directly into current debates in moral psychology regarding love for particular others such as family and friends, and their relation to forms of self-love. The discussions of forgiveness, including self-forgiveness and self-respect, are especially rewarding. Lippitt writes clearly and his analyses will be accessible to readers without a prior speciality in Kierkegaard, including anyone interested in theories of love.’
- John J. Davenport, Fordham University

‘Building on the resources offered by Kierkegaard’s Works of Love, John Lippitt adds a crucial voice to contemporary philosophical discussions of love. Readers to whom any mention of self-love brings to mind an objectionable kind of selfishness ought to be persuaded early in Lippitt’s argument that the topic cannot be ignored by anyone seeking to understand moral life.’ 
- Rick Furtak, Colorado College

‘this is a tightly argued and philosophically well-informed book that draws on a detailed knowledge of Kierkegaard's work and of the relevant secondary literature. As such, it provides a useful point of entry for students and established scholars into the internal complexity of Kierkegaard's moral thought and the issues it addresses. The position it constructively advances is humane, compassionate, and sensible, but also not undemanding. … exceptional stimulus to further reading and thinking’.
- George Pattison, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

'This book is clearly written and closely argued, and sets a fine example of how to engage Kierkegaard in a critical yet appreciative manner that brings his voice into contemporary discussions that bear centrally on questions about how human life should be lived.' C. Stephen Evans, Baylor University, Texas
Research Interests:
"Publishing in the bicentenary year of Kierkegaard's birth, this handbook showcases leading contemporary scholarship on Kierkegaard's context, key ideas, and legacy. Brings together a truly international team of contributors, enabling... more
"Publishing in the bicentenary year of Kierkegaard's birth, this handbook showcases leading contemporary scholarship on Kierkegaard's context, key ideas, and legacy.
Brings together a truly international team of contributors, enabling fruitful dialogue between American, British, German and Danish scholarship.
Draws extensively on the unique scholarly resources Kierkegaard Research Centre in Copenhagen.
Makes reference to the latest scholarly edition of Kierkegaard's works throughout.

The Oxford Handbook of Kierkegaard brings together some of the most distinguished contemporary contributors to Kierkegaard research together with some of the more gifted younger commentators on Kierkegaard's work. There is significant input from scholars based in Copenhagen's Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre, as well as from philosophers and theologians from Australia, Britain, Germany, and the United States. Part 1 presents some of the philological, historical and contextual work that has been produced in recent years, establishing a firm basis for the more interpretative essays found in following parts. This includes looking at the history of his published and unpublished works, his cultural and social context, and his relation to Romanticism, German Idealism, the Church, the Bible, and theological traditions. Part 2 moves from context and background to the exposition of some of the key ideas and issues in Kierkegaard's writings. Attention is paid to his style, his treatment of ethics, culture, society, the self, time, theology, love, irony, and death. Part 3 looks at the impact of Kierkegaard's thought and at how it continues to influence philosophy, theology, and literature. After an examination of issues around translating Kierkegaard, this section includes comparisons with Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein, as well as examining his role in modern theology, moral philosophy, phenomenology, postmodernism, and literature."
'John Lippitt's original and polished study brings into focus a crucial but massively neglected concept in Kierkegaard's work: humour. Kierkegaard himself is clear enough about its importance, but it has been largely ignored by both... more
'John Lippitt's original and polished study brings into focus a crucial but massively neglected concept in Kierkegaard's work: humour. Kierkegaard himself is clear enough about its importance, but it has been largely ignored by both philosophical and theological commentators, mesmerized perhaps by the image of Kierkegaard as 'the melancholy Dane'. But Lippitt not only restores an essential feature to our picture of Kierkegaard, he also shows that Kierkegaard can contribute to our understanding of humour, and that humour is itself philosophically interesting and helpful. His discussion and examples are far-ranging, making this essential reading not only for Kierkegaard specialists but for all who are interested in understanding humanity's distinctive capacity for laughter.' - George Pattison, King's College, Cambridge

'Kierkegaard famously urged his readers to respect the autonomy of his pseudonyms. John Lippitt's clear, elegant and carefully argued reading of the Concluding Unscientific Postscript illustrates the benefits of taking this advice seriously. Lippitt connects Johannes Climacus' repeated claim to be a humorist with Stanley Cavell's understanding of moral perfectionism, and thereby opens up an original and powerful interpretation of Kierkegaard's conception of religious belief, and of the more general ethical significance of humour. No future discussion of these matters can afford to ignore Lippitt's claims.' - Stephen Mulhall, New College, Oxford

'This is at once a profoundly lucid and compelling reading of the Concluding Unscientific Postscript and a significant meditation on the ethical themes of exemplarity and perfectionism central to post-Kantian moral philosophy. Written in Lippitt's characteristically accessible and engaging prose, this study demonstrates the centrality of humour to Kierkegaard's understanding of philosophy as an ethical practice - and, thereby, situates Kierkegaard's work in an ethical tradition of philosophy which extends from Socrates to Wittgenstein by way of Montaigne and Nietzsche. This book will be essential reading not only for Kierkegaard scholars but also for all concerned with the ethical character of philosophy.' - David Owen, University of Southampton

'Lippit makes intriguing new connections between the comic and other Kierkegaardian themes...I find this a fascinating book...bold in its engagements with disputed aspects of Kierkegaard exegesis, and ambitious (and successful) in its attempt to develop wider perspectives on the relevance of the comic to both the ethical and religious life in general.' - M. Jamie Ferreira, Theologische Literaturzeitung

'This [is] a well written, particularly lucid, eminently relevant and often illuminating book from an author who appears very well qualified to write it, being well-versed in both the philosophy of humour and in the study of Kierkegaard's writings.' - M.Ray, Heythrop Journal

'[I]t does not simply provoke us to argue with it in its own terms but also to engage more deeply with the questions and issues that it addresses...[T]hese questions and issues are of central importance and given...relaively little explicit or sustained attention...in the secondary literature...[T]he relevance of Lippitt's book will therefore be of long-term interest to Kierkegaard scholars...my guess is that it will be of similar long-term interest to philosophers interested in the question of humour...Lippitt's book...has a nice lightness of touch suitable to its topic - and one, I think, that could be enulated in philosophical discussions on very different subjects.' - George Pattison, Soren Kierkegaard Newsletter
Research Interests:
Co-edited with John Lippitt. Collection of essays on Nietzsche and religion.
This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution.
New article on Kierkegaard in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The aim of this paper is to make sense of cases of apparent nonsense in the writings of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. Against commentators such as Cora Diamond and James Conant, we argue that, in the case of Wittgenstein, recognising such... more
The aim of this paper is to make sense of cases of apparent nonsense in the writings of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. Against commentators such as Cora Diamond and James Conant, we argue that, in the case of Wittgenstein, recognising such a category of nonsense is necessary in order to understand the development of his thought. In the case of Kierkegaard, we argue against the view that the notion of the ‘absolute paradox’ of the Christian incarnation is intended to be nonsensical. However, we recognise that Kierkegaard’s discussion of Christianity uses a similar methodology to a Wittgensteinian grammatical investigation. We maintain that by making sense of their respective views on nonsense and paradox we are able more fully to appreciate their positions on, and approaches to, ethics and religion.
Objectives: 1.Introduce Fear and Trembling within the context of Kierkegaard’s wider authorship. 2. Identify the pseudonymous author of the book and suggest some additional complicationsthat this introduces for understanding it. 3.... more
Objectives:
1.Introduce Fear and Trembling within the context of Kierkegaard’s wider authorship.
2. Identify the pseudonymous author of the book and suggest some additional complicationsthat this introduces for understanding it.
3. Explain the main themes and structure of the book.
4. Outline some of the main concerns of each section.
This chapter sketches some central features of Kierkegaard's discussion of forgiveness. It focuses on the relationship between the divine forgiveness of sins and interpersonal forgiveness between human beings; the difficulties of... more
This chapter sketches some central features of Kierkegaard's discussion of forgiveness. It focuses on the relationship between the divine forgiveness of sins and interpersonal forgiveness between human beings; the difficulties of accepting, as well as offering, forgiveness; and the importance of love to our understanding of forgiveness. Neighbour-love incorporates, for Kierkegaard, a certain way of seeing the other, which highlights the need for certain other virtues or spiritual qualities, such as generosity of spirit, humility and hope. Kierkegaard, I suggest, is interested in what it means to be a forgiving person, as an aspect of what it means to be a loving person. The chapter also summarises some secondary literature on Kierkegaard and forgiveness published in recent years.
In this chapter, I argue that part of the answer to the problem of worry is to be found in a certain view of humility: one that can be teased out from several Kierkegaardian discourses, and which has recently been gaining increasing... more
In this chapter, I argue that part of the answer to the problem of worry is to be found in a certain view of humility: one that can be teased out from several Kierkegaardian discourses, and which has recently been gaining increasing support—from both philosophers and psychologists—against competing views of humility. Humility is understood not in terms of self-abasement, underestimating oneself, or being ignorant of one’s good qualities, but rather in terms of being focused on others and sources of value besides oneself: thinking not less of oneself, but thinking less about oneself. Exploring the centrality of future-oriented worries to Kierkegaard’s lily and bird discourses in particular, I argue that such worries often stem from excessive, debilitating self-absorption, which the variety of humility sketched here enables us to avoid. I aim to show how this conception of humility addresses questions such as how those of impressive achievements may nevertheless remain humble, and why its relative lack of self-focus does not rule out the possibility of self-improvement.
Abstract of recent article in Philosophy and Literature. Currently available for open access download here: https://muse.jhu.edu/article/728542 Abstract What does it take to forgive oneself? I argue that reflection on Briony... more
Abstract of recent article in Philosophy and Literature. Currently available for open access download here:

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/728542

Abstract
What does it take to forgive oneself? I argue that reflection on Briony Tallis in Ian McEwan’s Atonement can help us understand two key aspects of self-forgiveness. First, she illustrates an unorthodox conception of humility that, I argue, aids the process of responsible self-forgiveness. Second, she fleshes out a self-forgiveness that includes continued self-reproach. While Briony illustrates elements of the self-absorption about which critics of continued self-reproach (such as Margaret Holmgren) are rightly concerned, she also shows a way of getting beyond this, such that the delicate balance between self-forgiveness and self-condemnation is upheld. Atonement also shows the significance for the task of self-forgiveness of a particular kind of narrative continuity.
What difference would it make to our understanding of the process of interpersonal forgiveness to treat it as what Kierkegaard calls a ‘work of love’? In this article, I argue that such an approach – which I label ‘love’s forgiveness’ -... more
What difference would it make to our understanding of the process of interpersonal forgiveness to treat it as what Kierkegaard calls a ‘work of love’? In this article, I argue that such an approach – which I label ‘love’s forgiveness’ - challenges key assumptions in two prominent philosophical accounts of forgiveness. First, it challenges ‘desert-based’ views, according to which forgiveness at its best is ‘conditional’ upon such features as the wrongdoer’s repentance and making amends. But second, it also avoids legitimate worries raised against some forms of ‘unconditional’ forgiveness (such as Derrida’s claim that true forgiveness can forgive only ‘the unforgivable’). I argue that ‘love’s forgiveness’ neither endorses the Derridean view, nor communicates to the wrongdoer that no judgement is being made on her action. ‘Love’s vision’, I argue, has a crucial role to play in interpersonal forgiveness. I consider the objection that viewing forgiveness as a work of love is problematic because love involves a certain wilful blindness. Drawing on both Kierkegaard and some contemporary work in the philosophy of love, I examine Troy Jollimore’s argument that love has epistemic standards of its own, further arguing that in the relevant respects claims about romantic love and friendship can be extended to the case of agapic love of neighbour. By developing this view in relation to several key sections of Kierkegaard’s Works of Love, I show the importance of understanding ‘love’s forgiveness’ in the light of other virtues, especially hope and humility.
Research Interests:
In recent years, a growing body of work has connected Kierkegaard with discussions of the virtues. But how do these virtue terms hang together, for Kierkegaard? Part of the answer is obvious, insofar as most such ‘Kierkegaardian virtues’... more
In recent years, a growing body of work has connected Kierkegaard with discussions of the virtues. But how do these virtue terms hang together, for Kierkegaard? Part of the answer is obvious, insofar as most such ‘Kierkegaardian virtues’ are either expressions of, or in some other way related to, faith. But can we say more than this? In this paper, inspired by an approach taken by Robert C. Roberts in his Spiritual Emotions, I explore the prospects for understanding three such notions - contentment, patience and hope - as rooted in underlying attitudes of humility and gratitude. I explore what kind of humility and gratitude is in play, before going on to consider how these attitudes might support that species of contentment that seems integral to Kierkegaard’s discourses on the lilies and the birds. How, in turn, might this give rise to patience and hope, and of what sort? The paper thus seeks to sketch something of the internal dynamics of the relations between several virtue-terms including how, for Kierkegaard, they are all rooted in an image of God as He who forgives.
Throughout his authorship, Kierkegaard shows an intense fascination with Socrates and Socratic self-knowledge. This chapter will trace, in roughly chronological order: (1) the young Kierkegaard’s autobiographical reflections on... more
Throughout his authorship, Kierkegaard shows an intense fascination with Socrates and Socratic self-knowledge. This chapter will trace, in roughly chronological order: (1) the young Kierkegaard’s autobiographical reflections on self-knowledge, when first coming to understand his task as an author; (2) Socrates as a negative figure in The Concept of Irony - where self-knowledge is understood in terms of separation from others and the surrounding society - and the contrast with the Concluding Unscientific Postscript’s treatment of Socrates as an exemplary “subjective thinker”; (3) in Either/Or, the connection between self-knowledge and self-transparency, and the link between self-knowledge and “choosing oneself”, understood as willing receptivity; (4) in writings such as The Concept of Anxiety and The Sickness Unto Death, the importance of sin and our utter dependence upon God for the question of whether self-knowledge is ever really possible; and (5) in Judge for Yourself! and related journal entries, a more precise specification of what Christian self-knowledge might amount to.
Research Interests:
[A later version of this paper appears in Manu Bazzano and Julie Webb (eds) Therapy and the Counter-Tradition (Routledge, 2016).] Why should therapists read Søren Kierkegaard? In our largely secular age, in which the latest generation... more
[A later version of this paper appears in Manu Bazzano and Julie Webb (eds) Therapy and the Counter-Tradition (Routledge, 2016).]

Why should therapists read Søren Kierkegaard? In our largely secular age, in which the latest generation of religion’s ‘cultured despisers’ often seem to speak for the cultural mainstream, what has psychotherapy to learn from an unorthodox nineteenth century Lutheran with an uncompromising view of the importance of a proper ‘God-relationship’? There can be no denying the influence of Kierkegaard on important psychotherapeutic figures as diverse as Ludwig Binswanger, Rollo May, Carl Rogers, R. D. Laing and Ernest Becker.  His insightful diagnoses of anxiety and despair have been a significant influence, via Heidegger, on existential psychotherapy. As one therapist recently told me, Kierkegaard is a source of great insight provided we ‘ignore the religious stuff’. Yet therapists who insist on taking their Kierkegaard safely secularised are missing a trick. In this article, I shall argue that it is in some of his lesser known, explicitly ‘religious’ writings, that Kierkegaard offers some of his most important insights for therapeutic practice. I have argued elsewhere that Kierkegaard offers a rich conception of ‘proper self-love’ that I believe has important implications for therapy. Central to this account is the application to ourselves of the trust, hope and forgiveness that are central to his accounts of love of God and neighbour.  But here I shall concentrate primarily on a perhaps surprising theme from this famous diagnostician of anxiety and despair: what the reflections on ‘the lilies and the birds’ in Kierkegaard’s ‘upbuilding’ discourses can teach us about contentment and self-acceptance and their relation to gratitude and patience.
In her highly critical account of Harry Frankfurt's account of self-love (in this volume), Sylvia Walsh presents Kierkegaard’s Christian view as a corrective to Frankfurt’s naturalistic account. Walsh criticises Frankfurt for lacking a... more
In her highly critical account of Harry Frankfurt's account of self-love (in this volume), Sylvia Walsh presents Kierkegaard’s Christian view as a corrective to Frankfurt’s naturalistic account. Walsh criticises Frankfurt for lacking a concept of self-denial, and this notion is central to the view of self-love she finds in Kierkegaard. In this paper, I argue that while Frankfurt’s account of self-love certainly warrants criticism, it does bring to light some key points that can be brought to bear on how we may best understand Kierkegaard’s view of proper self-love. First, we can see from Frankfurt’s account how love – not just of oneself, but also of others - entails commitment, and that such commitment requires an appropriate relation to oneself. Further, Frankfurt shows clearly how self-love necessarily points outside the self and how love can involve self-interest without being based upon it in a ‘merely selfish’ way. For Frankfurt, love involves caring about the good of the person or thing loved for their own sake. So in self-love, I care about the good of myself for my own sake. This reminder – phrased in more Christian terminology, that I am a ‘neighbour’ too – gives an important standard against which accounts of Kierkegaardian self-love should be measured. It is, I argue, a problem for accounts which would have us put too much emphasis on self-denial. There is, on these matters, a more moderate – more loving? - Kierkegaard, and his voice should be heard. While it is true that Kierkegaard describes self-denial as ‘Christianity’s essential form’, there are other things he says which qualify this. In the final section, I’ll point out the relevance for oneself of his focus on trust and hope, and his insistence on the importance of accepting that one’s sins are forgiven, and the self-forgiveness consequent upon this.
Kierkegaard’s work contains rich discussions of several virtue-terms: faith; courage; trust; patience; gratitude; humility; hope. Several recent interpretations of Fear and Trembling have connected Abraham’s faith with some related such... more
Kierkegaard’s work contains rich discussions of several virtue-terms: faith; courage; trust; patience; gratitude; humility; hope. Several recent interpretations of Fear and Trembling have connected Abraham’s faith with some related such terms: for instance, a series of recent articles by John J. Davenport has treated faith as “eschatological trust”,  while Clare Carlisle places courage centre-stage.  I find myself increasingly attracted to the “faith as eschatological trust” reading. My purpose here is to try to complement Davenport’s account, by putting more emphasis than is typical on the role of hope in Abraham’s faith. (Although it plays a significant role in the eschatological trust interpretation, Davenport does not discuss hope in detail.) I aim to flesh this out by reading Fear and Trembling against the background of the 1843 discourse “The expectancy of faith”, one of the discourses in which – as both Robert C. Roberts and William McDonald have noted - Kierkegaard discusses the concept of hope in most detail.  Then, after a brief outline of the “eschatological trust” reading of Fear and Trembling, I’ll discuss two possible objections thereto, arising from “The expectancy of faith”. Both, I’ll suggest, can be resisted. The second can be addressed by comparing Abraham’s hope with the “radical hope” discussed by Jonathan Lear in his book of that title. This reading seeks to clarify, in more detail than hitherto, the importance of hope in existential faith. It will also throw some light on what Johannes de silentio calls “the courage of faith”, and why he describes that courage as “humble”.
This short paper is scheduled to appear as one of the entries in a book series on Kierkegaard's Concepts (part of the multi-volume Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources series). In line with the house style, it opens with... more
This short paper is scheduled to appear as one of the entries in a book series on Kierkegaard's Concepts (part of the multi-volume Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources series). In line with the house style, it opens with a brief discussion of the etymology of the Danish terms Tilgivelse and Forladelse, before moving on to a discussion of how Kierkegaard addresses the theme of forgiveness - with continual reference to the forgiveness of sins - throughout his authorship. In line with the purposes of the volume, the focus is on exegesis rather than critique.
What kind of a therapist is Kierkegaard? In this brief response to Helle Møller Jensen & George Pattison's rendering of some of Kierkegaard's Upbuilding Discourses as dialogues, I shall approach this question by looking at a major form of... more
What kind of a therapist is Kierkegaard? In this brief response to Helle Møller Jensen & George Pattison's rendering of some of Kierkegaard's Upbuilding Discourses as dialogues, I shall approach this question by looking at a major form of contemporary psychotherapy that claims Kierkegaard as an influence. Carl Rogers’ ‘person-centred’ approach is one of the most commonly practiced forms of contemporary psychotherapy. I shall argue that what Kierkegaard offers is something essentially different from Rogers' approach. In fact, I argue, Rogers’ position ultimately rests on assumptions that manifest a version of what Kierkegaard calls the ‘despair of defiance’. I consider the view of the self and its autonomy presupposed by Rogers’ approach, and compare this view with that of Anti-Climacus, the pseudonym under which Kierkegaard wrote The Sickness Unto Death. While finding something admirable about person-centred therapy’s trust in its clients, I thus raise some Kierkegaard-inspired questions about this trust. And I close by briefly considering how, both in the dialogues presented here and in the therapeutic relationship, a kind of ‘indirect communication’ may be at work.
"Kierkegaard’s Works of Love has often been accused of being unable to deal adequately with ‘special relationships’. This debate has re-emerged in a fresh form in a recent disagreement in the secondary literature between M. Jamie Ferreira... more
"Kierkegaard’s Works of Love has often been accused of being unable to deal adequately with ‘special relationships’. This debate has re-emerged in a fresh form in a recent disagreement in the secondary literature between M. Jamie Ferreira and Sharon Krishek. Krishek charges Ferreira with failing to acknowledge some important conflicts in Kierkegaard’s account of preferential love. In this article, I argue that some key passages are indeed insufficiently addressed in Ferreira’s account. Yet ultimately, I argue, Krishek ends up condemning the Kierkegaard of Works of Love unfairly. As a solution to Krishek’s concerns, I present a defence of Kierkegaard’s position centred round the image of God as a ‘filter’ through which our loves must pass. Also, while acknowledging that Krishek raises some important questions for Ferreira’s account, I outline a possible response, based in part on Kierkegaard’s idea that neighbour love is only a ‘sketch’ until brought to fruition in any given manifestation of concrete love. Ultimately, I claim, Kierkegaard’s position in Works of Love can indeed be defended from Krishek’s critique.

Keywords: God, Kierkegaard, neighbour-love, preferential love, self-love."
Citation: Lippitt, J 2010,'Irony and humour in the Postscript', in RA Furtak (ed.), Kierkegaard's' Concluding Unscientific Postscript': A Critical Guide Cambridge Critical Guides, CAMBRIDGE... more
Citation: Lippitt, J 2010,'Irony and humour in the Postscript', in RA Furtak (ed.), Kierkegaard's' Concluding Unscientific Postscript': A Critical Guide Cambridge Critical Guides, CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS, Cambridge, pp. 149-169.
In a mini-project funded by the Subject Centre for Philosophical and Religious Studies, we reviewed the educational literature on peer support and used focus groups to explore students’ ideas of academic and critical friendship. We report... more
In a mini-project funded by the Subject Centre for Philosophical and Religious Studies, we reviewed the educational literature on peer support and used focus groups to explore students’ ideas of academic and critical friendship. We report on our findings, make some connections with philosophical writing on friendship, and offer some steps that institutions might take to foster academically fecund friendships among philosophy students.
In recent commentary on Kierkegaard’s Works of Love , a distinction is commonly drawn between ‘proper’ and ‘selfish’ forms of self-love. In arguing that not all vices of self-focus can be captured under the heading of selfishness, I seek... more
In recent commentary on Kierkegaard’s Works of Love , a distinction is commonly drawn between ‘proper’ and ‘selfish’ forms of self-love. In arguing that not all vices of self-focus can be captured under the heading of selfishness, I seek to distinguish selfishness from self-centredness. But the latter vice has a far more handsome cousin: proper self-focus of the kind necessary for ‘becoming a self’. As various feminist thinkers
have argued, this will be missed if we valorise self-sacrifice too uncritically. But nor need the latter concept be ditched. By distinguishing varieties of self-sacrifice, we can see the importance of avoiding the all too easy slide from proper self-sacrifice to outright self-annihilation. And we can discover that this avoidance is aided by recognising a kind of pride as part of true self-love.
In a mini-project funded by the Subject Centre for Philosophical and Religious Studies, we used focus groups to explore students’ answers to six questions, including their reasons for going to university and their views of the purpose of... more
In a mini-project funded by the Subject Centre for Philosophical and Religious Studies, we used focus groups to explore students’ answers to six questions, including their reasons for going to university and their views of the purpose of higher education. Particular surprises were the invisibility of research to students and the depth of disagreement about the value of seminars. But most significant was the consequence of the dramatic decline in contact hours on arrival at university. Students found it difficult to form supportive study relationships. They also seem unclear about the distinction between collaboration and collusion. We end, therefore, by suggesting that learning and teaching practice needs to be illuminated by reflections on critical friendship.
Though there are significant points of overlap between Michelle Kosch’s reading of Fear and Trembling and my own, this paper focuses primarily on a significant difference: the legitimacy or otherwise of looking to paradigmatic exemplars... more
Though there are significant points of overlap between Michelle Kosch’s reading of Fear and Trembling and my own, this paper focuses primarily on a significant difference: the legitimacy or otherwise of looking to paradigmatic exemplars of faith in order to understand faith. I argue that Kosch’s reading threatens to underplay the importance of exemplarity in Kierkegaard’s thought, and that there is good reason to resist her use of Philosophical Fragments as the key to interpreting the ‘hidden message’ of Fear and Trembling. Key to both claims is the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. I also briefly sketch an alternative reading of the ‘hidden message’, one in which Kierkegaard’s Christian commitments play a notably different role.
In this article, I offer a brief account of some of Kierkegaard’s key concerns about friendship: its “preferential” nature and its being a form of self-love. Kierkegaard’s endorsement of the ancient idea of the friend as “second self”... more
In this article, I offer a brief account of some of Kierkegaard’s key concerns about friendship: its “preferential” nature and its being a form of self-love. Kierkegaard’s endorsement of the ancient idea of the friend as “second self” involves a common but misguided assumption: that friendship depends largely upon likeness between friends. This focus obscures a vitally important element, highlighted by the so-called “drawing” view of friendship. Once this is emphasized, we can see a significant aspect - though by no means all - of Kierkegaard’s worry as misplaced. However, the “drawing” view also enables us to begin to see what a “Kierkegaardian” friendship might look like.
As part of the widespread turn to narrative in contemporary philosophy, several commentators have recently attempted to sign Kierkegaard up for the narrative cause, most notably in John Davenport and Anthony Rudd's recent collection... more
As part of the widespread turn to narrative in contemporary philosophy, several commentators have recently attempted to sign Kierkegaard up for the narrative cause, most notably in John Davenport and Anthony Rudd's recent collection Kierkegaard After MacIntyre: Essays on Freedom, Narrative and Virtue. I argue that the aesthetic and ethical existence‐spheres in Either/Or cannot adequately be distinguished in terms of the MacIntyre‐inspired notion of ‘narrative unity’. Judge William's argument for the ethical life contains far more in the way of substantive normative content than can be encapsulated by the idea of ‘narrative unity’, and the related idea that narratives confer intelligibility will not enable us to distinguish Kierkegaardian aesthetes from Kierkegaardian ethicists. ‘MacIntyrean Kierkegaardians’ also take insufficient notice of further problems with MacIntyre's talk of ‘narrative unity’, such as his failure to distinguish between literary narratives and the ‘enacted dramatic narratives’ of which he claims our lives consist; the lack of clarity in the idea of a ‘whole life’; and the threat of self‐deception. Finally, against the connections that have been drawn between Kierkegaardian choice and Harry Frankfurt's work on volitional identification, I show something of the dangers involved in putting too much stress on unity and wholeheartedness.
This article investigates the concept of ‘narrative unity’ as used by recent commentators such as John Davenport. I argue that it is unclear what this term means, and that the ‘narrative unity’ view faces a serious problem:... more
This article investigates the concept of ‘narrative unity’ as used by recent commentators such as John Davenport. I argue that it is unclear what this term means, and that the ‘narrative unity’ view faces a serious problem: self-deception. Moreover, if we ask whether a pseudonym’s life possesses ‘narrative unity’, further problems emerge, as the Johannes Climacus case highlights. Davenport assigns a key role to ‘earnestness’. Yet Climacus and others insist true earnestness involves a unity of earnestness and jest. Considering this enables us to see something of the importance for Kierkegaard of a sense of humour in a virtuous life.
Robert C. Roberts has argued that a sense of humour can be a moral virtue. I show how such a claim is rooted in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and - drawing on Aristotle and Kierkegaard - explore what features a ‘virtuous’ sense of humour... more
Robert C. Roberts has argued that a sense of humour can be a moral virtue. I show how such a claim is rooted in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and - drawing on Aristotle and Kierkegaard - explore what features a ‘virtuous’ sense of humour would need to possess. I support Roberts’ view that certain forms of moral wisdom are partially constituted by the possession of a certain kind of sense of humour, and that exposure to such can be a useful tool in moral education. But it does not follow from this that such a sense of humour is a distinct virtue. I also criticise Roberts’ claim that a sense of humour needs to be accompanied by compassion and hope to count as ‘virtuous’, and aim to show how humour lacking such qualities can play a role of vital ethical importance, such as fostering the self-recognition upon which self-knowledge depends.
ON AUTHORITY AND REVOCATION: CLIMACUS AS HUMORIST John Lippitt University of Hertfordshire Just as in ... finds a note at the back of the book that notifies the reader that everything ... cases, since Conant quotes from the older... more
ON AUTHORITY AND REVOCATION: CLIMACUS AS HUMORIST John Lippitt University of Hertfordshire Just as in ... finds a note at the back of the book that notifies the reader that everything ... cases, since Conant quotes from the older translation by David F. Swenson and Walter ...
This paper investigates Johannes Climacus''s infamous satire against Hegelianism in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. In considering why Climacus aims to show speculative thought as comical rather than simply mistaken, it is argued... more
This paper investigates Johannes Climacus''s infamous satire against Hegelianism in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. In considering why Climacus aims to show speculative thought as comical rather than simply mistaken, it is argued that Climacus sees the need for the comic as a vital form of ''indirect communication.'' The thinker who approaches ethical and religious questions in an inappropriately ''objective'' manner is in the grip of an illusion which can only be dispelled by his coming to see his own confusion, and satire (as well as other forms of the comic) can be a more effective weapon in dispelling such illusions than can more ''direct'' forms of critical argument. Moreover, it is argued that the ''Hegelian'' is not simply a figure at whom Climacus''s readers are invited to scoff. Rather, we are intended to see ourselves as prone to the same kind of confusions and evasions. Thus Climacus''s ostensibly anti-Hegelian satire is itself a form of indirect communication which, if we do see how it rebounds upon ourselves, serves a vital ethical-religious purpose.
The aim of this paper is to make sense of cases of apparent nonsense in the writings of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. Against commentators such as Cora Diamond and James Conant, we argue that, in the case of Wittgenstein, recognizing such... more
The aim of this paper is to make sense of cases of apparent nonsense in the writings of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. Against commentators such as Cora Diamond and James Conant, we argue that, in the case of Wittgenstein, recognizing such a category of nonsense is necessary in order to understand the development of his thought. In the case of Kierkegaard, we argue against the view that the notion of the 'absolute paradox' of the Christian incarnation is intended to be nonsensical. However, we recognize that Kierkegaard's discussion of Christianity uses a similar methodology to a Wittgensteinian grammatical investigation. We maintain that by making sense of their respective views on nonsense we are able more fully to appreciate their positions on, and approaches to, ethics and religion.
The aim of this paper is to make sense of cases of apparent nonsense in the writings of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. Against commentators such as Cora Diamond and James Conant, we argue that, in the case of Wittgenstein, recognizing such... more
The aim of this paper is to make sense of cases of apparent nonsense in the writings of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. Against commentators such as Cora Diamond and James Conant, we argue that, in the case of Wittgenstein, recognizing such a category of nonsense is necessary in order to understand the development of his thought. In the case of Kierkegaard, we argue against the view that the notion of the 'absolute paradox' of the Christian incarnation is intended to be nonsensical. However, we recognize that Kierkegaard's discussion of Christianity uses a similar methodology to a Wittgensteinian grammatical investigation. We maintain that by making sense of their respective views on nonsense we are able more fully to appreciate their positions on, and approaches to, ethics and religion.
... Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2299/3953. Title: Nietzsche,Zarathustra and the status of laughter. Authors: Lippitt, J. Issue Date: 1992. Publisher: Oxford University Press. Citation:... more
... Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2299/3953. Title: Nietzsche,Zarathustra and the status of laughter. Authors: Lippitt, J. Issue Date: 1992. Publisher: Oxford University Press. Citation: British Journal of Aesthetics 32 (1) pp.39-49. ...
One major source of moral distress can be a hierarchical institutional context in which the individual worker’s sense of the good conflicts, in a non-trivial way, with the perceived goals of the organisation as understood by an... more
One major source of moral distress can be a hierarchical institutional context in which the individual worker’s sense of the good conflicts, in a non-trivial way, with the perceived goals of the organisation as understood by an institutional superior. Taking my lead from the context of policing, I shall suggest that this is an environment in which forgiveness – and self-forgiveness – have important roles to play. In doing so, however, I shall offer a partial defence of a reactive attitude often dismissed too quickly in the forgiveness literature: resentment. Drawing on an unorthodox account thereof, I shall argue that negotiating the competing claims of resentment and forgiveness can be key to dealing with moral distress. As well as saying a little about the roles of love and hope in forgiveness, I shall raise the question of how both forgiveness and resentment relate to medio-passive agency. Could both forgiveness and resentment be different ways of expressing one’s power in a situation of apparent powerlessness?
Research Interests:
What would it be to view forgiveness as what Kierkegaard calls a ‘work of love’? What assumptions and emphases prevalent in some prominent philosophical discussions of forgiveness might this alter? Drawing on both Kierkegaard and some... more
What would it be to view forgiveness as what Kierkegaard calls a ‘work of love’? What assumptions and emphases prevalent in some prominent philosophical discussions of forgiveness might this alter? Drawing on both Kierkegaard and some contemporary work on forgiveness, this paper will consider the objection that viewing forgiveness as a work of love is problematic because love involves a certain wilful blindness. Love’s ‘blindness’, and more generally its partiality, is a familiar charge in the philosophy of love, and this is a challenge that perhaps arises for any ‘vision’ view of love (such as I take Kierkegaard’s to be). In an attempt to address this worry, I shall compare Kierkegaard with a valuable contemporary such view, that of Troy Jollimore, aiming to examine Jollimore’s argument that love has epistemic standards of its own, and considering whether his claims about romantic love and friendship can be extended to the case of agapic love of the neighbour. Drawing on Kierkegaard’s own discussion, I shall sketch some of the implications and further questions arising from this view, with particular reference to the importance of hope, humility and active receptivity in the process of forgiveness. The result, I hope, will be a sketch of forgiveness which gives greater prominence to aspects to which relatively little attention has been paid in some prominent contemporary discussions.
Research Interests:
Looking forward to participating in a workshop on 'Humor in Nineteenth-Century Philosophy' organised by the Boston University Workshop on Late Modern Philosophy. Speaking alongside: Fred Beiser (Syracuse), Matthew Meyer (Scranton), Lydia... more
Looking forward to participating in a workshop on 'Humor in Nineteenth-Century Philosophy' organised by the Boston University Workshop on Late Modern Philosophy. Speaking alongside: Fred Beiser (Syracuse), Matthew Meyer (Scranton), Lydia Moland (Colby), Christopher Ricks (Boston), Marcia Robinson (Syracuse) and Allen Speight (Boston).
Looking forward to giving an invited talk at a conference on 'Love and the Good' in Pardubice (24th to 26th September). Further details to follow.
How can the writings of the philosopher Søren Kierkegaard help therapists and/or therapy? Kierkegaard is often presented in the context of psychotherapy primarily for his insights into anxiety and despair. Less well-known is the... more
How can the writings of the philosopher Søren Kierkegaard help therapists and/or therapy?

Kierkegaard is often presented in the context of psychotherapy primarily for his insights into anxiety and despair. Less well-known is the subject of this workshop: the potential his writings have to offers insight into self-doubt and self-acceptance, humility, hope, gratitude, patience and forgiveness (of others and oneself). Running through these discussions is the theme of love (of self and others). My co-facilitator - therapist and counsellor Julie Webb - and I plan to explore such themes and their potential relevance to practitioners and their clients. No prior knowledge of Kierkegaard will be assumed or expected.

If you are a practicing psychotherapist or counsellor who would be interested in participating in this event, please contact me, as we could probably accommodate a number of extra people.
Thoroughly enjoyed speaking at this special invited seminar at the University of Antwerp alongside C. Stephen Evans, Anthony Rudd, Roe Fremstedal, Karl Verstrynge and others. It was great to meet the Belgian and Dutch Kierkegaard... more
Thoroughly enjoyed speaking at this special invited seminar at the University of Antwerp alongside C. Stephen Evans, Anthony Rudd, Roe Fremstedal, Karl Verstrynge and others. It was great to meet the Belgian and Dutch Kierkegaard community, many of whom I've never previously met. Many thanks to Johan Taels and Rob Compaijen for organising.
I'll be presenting a draft of my chapter for a book of essays on the ideal of self-knowledge in the history of philosophy, to be edited by Ursula Renz and published by Oxford University Press.
Daphne Hampson and I will be introducing our new monographs on Kierkegaard and briefly raising questions for each other at this event in Sydney. Many thanks to Diego Bubbio for organising this. Program: 1.30 to 2.25 pm: Daphne... more
Daphne Hampson and I will be introducing our new monographs on Kierkegaard and briefly raising questions for each other at this event in Sydney. Many thanks to Diego Bubbio for organising this.

Program:

1.30 to 2.25 pm: Daphne Hampson, Kierkegaard: Exposition & Critique
Response by John Lippitt

2.25 to 2.35 pm: Break

2.35 to 3.30 pm: John Lippitt, Kierkegaard and the Problem of Self Love
Response by Daphne Hampson

3.30 pm: Afternoon tea.
The problem of whether we should love ourselves – and if so how – has particular resonance within Christian thought and is an important yet under-investigated theme in the writings of Søren Kierkegaard. In a forthcoming book, I argue... more
The problem of whether we should love ourselves – and if so how – has particular resonance within Christian thought and is an important yet under-investigated theme in the writings of Søren Kierkegaard. In a forthcoming book,  I argue that Works of Love provides us with the resources for a more fully rounded account of what constitutes Kierkegaardian ‘proper self-love’ than exists in the secondary literature. In this paper, I offer a summary of this argument, placing particular emphasis on the importance of trust, hope and forgiveness.
The centrality of forgiveness to Kierkegaard’s thought is often overlooked. Yet a number of recent studies have brought out its importance, in Works of Love and elsewhere. As part of a wider project investigating the problem of self-love... more
The centrality of forgiveness to Kierkegaard’s thought is often overlooked. Yet a number of recent studies have brought out its importance, in Works of Love and elsewhere. As part of a wider project investigating the problem of self-love in Kierkegaard,  this paper investigates the potentially vital role of self-forgiveness as part of proper self-love. I argue for the need for a middle ground between an excessive focus on ‘self-denial’ and a cheaply therapeutic view of self-forgiveness that diminishes the value of both interpersonal and intrapersonal forgiveness. Looking beyond the writers on forgiveness with whom Kierkegaard is typically compared (e.g. Derrida), I draw on the work of contemporary moral philosophers in a broadly Kantian tradition who have written insightfully on this topic (e.g. Robin Dillon, Margaret Holmgren and Linda Radzik). I argue that Kierkegaard’s account of how forgiveness is rooted in love offers a viable alternative to the dilemma – much discussed in this literature - of whether, and if so to what extent, self-forgiveness is dependent upon the victim’s forgiveness of the wrongdoer. But this literature also enables us to see some important traps into which a Kierkegaardian account of intrapersonal forgiveness as a work of love must avoid falling. The task of doing so also highlights the importance of the connection between forgiveness and other Kierkegaardian ‘virtues of love’. We can thus see Kierkegaard as having a significant contribution to make to contemporary thought about interpersonal and intrapersonal forgiveness.
In a forthcoming book, John Davenport has responded in detail to criticisms made by myself and others of the attempt to distinguish Kierkegaardian aesthetes from ethicists in terms of a notion of ‘narrative unity’ derived from Alasdair... more
In a forthcoming book, John Davenport has responded in detail to criticisms made by myself and others of the attempt to distinguish Kierkegaardian aesthetes from ethicists in terms of a notion of ‘narrative unity’ derived from Alasdair MacIntyre. In this paper, I explore central features of Davenport’s ‘new account’ of narrative unity, particularly what he calls unity-3, a qualified version of Harry Frankfurt’s ‘wholeheartedness’. Can this very abstract account adequately address practical issues at the level of the phenomenology of a lived life?  Suggesting that an answer will emerge only at the level of detail, I discuss a key element of David Velleman’s critique of Frankfurt’s valorisation of wholeheartedness. I connect Velleman’s discussion of Freud’s Rat Man with some recent literature on the nature of forgiveness. I argue that built into the very nature of an important variety of forgiveness – both of others and oneself – is an important ambivalence that a ‘wholeheartedness’ account cannot readily accommodate.
This paper explores the problem of distinguishing ‘proper’ and ‘improper’ forms of self-love arising from Kierkegaard’s Works of Love. This distinction has been discussed in several recent studies of Kierkegaard, but – I argue – no fully... more
This paper explores the problem of distinguishing ‘proper’ and ‘improper’ forms of self-love arising from Kierkegaard’s Works of Love. This distinction has been discussed in several recent studies of Kierkegaard, but – I argue – no fully satisfactory account of ‘proper self-love’ has been given. The claim that it must be understood in terms of the category of ‘self-denial’ (‘Christianity’s essential form’ ) is critically scrutinised, and I argue that many readings of Kierkegaard overegg his emphasis on self-denial. I argue that a more promising account of Kierkegaardian self-love can be derived from applying to the self the picture of love that emerges from several of the deliberations of the second series of Works of Love. Central to the picture that emerges is the importance of self-respect and of the virtues of hope, trust, mercifulness and forgiveness (including self-forgiveness). Through this investigation, I bring Kierkegaard and some of the most important secondary literature on Works of Love into dialogue with recent work on forgiveness, especially on the connection between self-forgiveness and self-respect.
The Danish thinker Søren Kierkegaard has often been represented as an enemy of friendship. While such a stark claim misrepresents his position, in Works of Love – a text much discussed in recent years - he offers some important warnings... more
The Danish thinker Søren Kierkegaard has often been represented as an enemy of friendship. While such a stark claim misrepresents his position, in Works of Love – a text much discussed in recent years - he offers some important warnings about friendship. This talk will examine these warnings, focussing in particular on a) the preferential nature of friendship and its potential threat to love of the neighbour, and b) the charge that friendship is often a form of disguised self-love. I’ll aim to show that Kierkegaard’s concerns about friendship highlight the importance of aiming to tease apart proper and improper forms of self-love, and I’ll close with some suggestions as to how we might attempt to do this.
In this paper, I argue that a major form of contemporary psychotherapy, the ‘person-centred’ approach associated with Carl Rogers, rests on assumptions that manifest a version of what Anti-Climacus labels the ‘despair of defiance’.... more
In this paper, I argue that a major form of contemporary psychotherapy, the ‘person-centred’ approach associated with Carl Rogers, rests on assumptions that manifest a version of what Anti-Climacus labels the ‘despair of defiance’. Accordingly, such a view is in danger of pandering to what sociologists have labelled the culture of self-esteem. It thus fails to address a question key to Kierkegaard's Works of Love: what is the difference between proper and improper self-love? I close by outlining some of the key obstacles an adequate answer to this question needs to navigate, in which I take my orientation from - but nevertheless suggest the need to look beyond - Kierkegaard.
This paper explores the problem of distinguishing ‘true’ and ‘improper’ forms of self-love arising from Kierkegaard’s Works of Love. The claim that true self-love can be understood in terms of the category of self-denial is critically... more
This paper explores the problem of distinguishing ‘true’ and ‘improper’ forms of self-love arising from Kierkegaard’s Works of Love. The claim that true self-love can be understood in terms of the category of self-denial is critically scrutinised. Against readings of Kierkegaard that place an excessive emphasis on self-denial, I argue that true self-love must make room for a certain kind of self-respect. I explore this further through a discussion of the limits of ‘lenience’ and ‘mercifulness’ in the context of self-forgiveness.
Review of John Davenport and Anthony Rudd's 2012 books, recently published in Faith and Philosophy (April 2015).
Research Interests:
... Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling Reviewed by. John Lippitt. Bookmark and Share. This journal is published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommerical 3.0 Unported license. Philosophy in Review ISSN 1206-5269... more
... Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling Reviewed by. John Lippitt. Bookmark and Share. This journal is published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommerical 3.0 Unported license. Philosophy in Review ISSN 1206-5269 EISSN 1920-8936. ...