The Axiochus is a Socratic dialogue written in the style of Plato’s early works. In it, Socrates tries to convince Axiochus, who is near death, that he has nothing to fear. Although the Axiochus was already recognised as spurious by the 3rd Century CE, it has been associated with the Platonic Academy from antiquity to the present. However, its arguments seem carelessly cobbled together. They are mutually inconsistent and internally flawed. How could such a work be considered worthy of the Academy? Scholars have answered this question in different ways. Some (Furley) argue that the Axiochus is irredeemably confused. Others (Hutchinson) argue that the dialogue belongs to the genre of consolation literature, in which consistency was not expected. More recently, Tim O’Keefe has argued that the dialogue demonstrates the Socratic practice of “therapeutic inconsistency”, showing readers how to use invalid arguments to induce comforting beliefs. I shall argue that a better solution to the puzzle is available: the Axiochus underscores a long-standing Platonic emphasis on engaging in critical evaluation of arguments even in the face of imminent death. This emphasis was already demonstrated in Plato’s Phaedo by Socrates’ commitment to argument when his interlocutors were afraid for him and themselves. It is demonstrated in the Axiochus by the way Socrates repeatedly encourages Axiochus to consider the (inconsistent) arguments he presents. The consolation of the Axiochus, I shall argue, is simply that the practice of reasoning calms fears by setting them to one side.
When
Wed Sep 12, 2018 3am – 4:30am Coordinated Universal Time
