There are a range of positions in the philosophy of time that we may call 'hybrid A-theoretic'. These positions hold that there is a metaphysically privileged present and that non-present entities also exist. There are two well known instances of such views. First, the Growing Block view: the past and present exist, the future does not, and the 'block' of reality 'grows' over time. Second, the Moving Spotlight view: the past present and future exist, and there is some objective privileging of an absolutely present moment (though of course which moment that is changes).

My aim here is to demonstrate that there is a telling objection against these hybrid A-theories. My starting point is David Braddon-Mitchell’s 2004 paper, 'How do we know that it's now now?'. I think that a careful study of this paper in fact reveals three distinct objections, each of which I want to explore. This teasing apart of the different arguments is useful because it has recently been claimed that Braddon-Mitchell's position is unclear and that however we disambiguate it, hybrid A-theories are left untouched. My response is that such responses fail, and that teasing apart some of the different ideas present in Braddon-Mitchell’s original paper enables us to develop robust objections to the hybrid A-theories. That being so, I suggest that we have good reason to reject hybrid A-theories.