Title: To What Extent Are We Left in the Dark About What to Do?
Speaker: Dr Pamela Robinson (ANU)
Abstract: Normative internalists and externalists disagree about things like whether, if you ought to do something, it must be that you’re able to tell that you ought to do it. Normative internalism is most naturally defined in a way that requires at least some normative states to be luminous—such that, necessarily, if you’re in them then you can tell that you are. Since no interesting normative states are luminous, I propose a next best version of normative internalism. It doesn’t require luminosity, but comes close, and therefore promises to accommodate almost as many internalist intuitions. However, given plausible assumptions about anti-luminosity, it entails something radical: that the set of all normative facts is uncodifiable. In fact, this is precisely how it manages to accommodate so many internalist intuitions. And I argue that it isn’t a good reason to reject it.
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