The purpose of this presentation is twofold: to defend my reading of Hume as residually sceptical, and to explore the wider significance of this reading. According to my reading of Hume, we cannot read the Treatise as expressing a single, consistent position from beginning to end. Rather, Hume experiences a sceptical crisis in the text and he decides to alter his attitudes towards the justification of his beliefs – becoming a moderate sceptic – as a result of this. The textual upshot of this is that we have a nice explanation of why Hume seems so sanguine about philosophy (and human reasoning in general) in some parts of his texts, but seems so deeply sceptical in other parts. However, one might resist the benefits of such an explanation in different ways: maybe it is not so simple to claim that Hume becomes a sceptic after his crisis, since that crisis appears at the end of Book One, but Books Two and Three are most certainly not sceptical texts. Another worry is that the residually sceptical reading leaves Hume in an unstable philosophical position: it doesn’t seem obvious how an extreme sceptical crisis can lead to moderate scepticism. I defend my view in light of these problems and in doing so I explain what difference it makes to our understanding of the history of philosophy.